You planted
your lovely Japanese Maple in a nice pot and it flourished – at least for a
while. So you added some fertilizer and moved the plant to a sunnier location.
That helped but only for a while. Your neighbor suggested JD but you didn’t
agree. Other friends suggested you try moving it to a bigger pot.
The economy
is not so different from the Japanese Maple. When growth slows, we
want to do something to restore healthy growth. It is not always obvious which
is the best remedial path to follow. So we will always have some difference of
opinion as to how to proceed. History helps us think about these competing policy
ideas.
Macro has a
history of policy preferences. Before the 1940s arrived, we had no strong
preferences for active policy and we preferred to let the markets work. Adam Smith’s invisible hand would heal the economy. As policy makers stood by, it
was believed that prices and wages would fall enough to restore weak demand to
stronger levels. Competition and markets would ensure growth in the longer
term.
The Great
Depression shook that theory. Despite large reductions in wages and prices, the
economy did not return quickly to its former strength. John M. Keynes was among a
number of economists whose theories supported a stronger role for government in
rehabbing a sick economy. While Keynes was not a big fan of monetary policy, he
did believe that fiscal policy could be used to kickstart a weak economy. If
people were too pessimistic about the future to spend, then the government
could spend or perhaps induce people and companies to spend through tax breaks.
This was the
start of Keynesian aggregate demand policy. It was notable for three reasons.
First, it gave a stronger role and perhaps an obligation for government to
intervene when an economy was in recession or headed for one. Second, it
was very specific that the intervention had something to do with reviving flagged
demand for goods and services. Third, other followers of Keynes were less
negative about monetary policy and added monetary policy to fiscal policies as
acceptable government macroeconomic tools.
This
approach to macroeconomic policy became the status quo until the late 1960s and
1970s when we experienced a series of supply shocks and a run of stagflation. Increasing
AD was not the remedy for this disease, since a policy to get people to buy more would
worsen inflation. And worse yet, with inflationary
expectations high and rising, any increase in spending would cause even more supply
shocks and stagflation.
What to do?
Nixon threw up his hands in frustration and landed on wage and price controls
as the solution. Even Spiro Agnew knew that wouldn’t work. The controls were stopped in
1974 after three frustrating years of failure. We were eventually treated to a remedy in the early 1980s when
the Fed stopped AD and inflationary expectations in their tracks with 20%+
interest rates. We had two recessions as a result. Lesson: don’t let
AD get out of the corral. Getting it back in is too painful.
Reagan and
Thatcher wondered if there was an easier way to combat stagflation.
And they hit upon aggregate supply policy. The idea is that sometimes a weak
economy is not primarily caused by reluctant consumer spending, but rather by uncertain business firms who
don’t want to take risks involved with producing more. It’s not easy to tell
what is causing an economy to slow. But clearly there are times when uncertainty of business firms
is what is mostly responsible for low levels of employment and output.
Depending on
which famous economist you bribe, he will tell you that AS policy is either
the best thing since sliced bread or worse than a Syrian Bar Mitzvah. But the
sad truth is that the concept has been thoroughly trashed by people who refer to
AS policy as a Trojan Horse, Voodoo, or Trickle-Down Economics. You would never give your kid any of those names. The challenge is that AS policy is aimed to
increase the incentives of business firms to produce. So instead of AS policy directly impacting your ability to spend, it starts by stimulating
firms with the idea that they will then produce more and probably hire more
workers and then they will spend like the Tuna after winning the lottery.
So what
about now? The situation now is that AD policy was tried, and it is out of
bullets. The Fed has kept interest rates at zero so long that interest no
longer impacts spending decisions. Of course, old fools like me are constrained
from spending because the interest earnings of our retirement accounts are
producing very little spending power. And if monetary policy is out of bullets,
fiscal policy did about all it could to give us cash for clunkers and now the
government is in debt with all projections showing the nation’s debt situation getting
worse and worse. Don’t count of the usual fiscal policy to get spending roaring
again.
So if AD
policy won’t work, what are we left with? Yup, we are pretty much left
with the Voodoo. I think AS policy is worth the risk. Maybe it won’t directly
and immediately improve the distribution of income. But most of us would be
more than happy to have growing job opportunities and rising incomes. Okay, maybe all those rich business executives will gain more than I will from an AS Policy – but
right now many people would be pretty happy to just get a job and/or a fat raise.
AS policy is
like making the pot bigger. The plant already has too much fertilizer on it.
The roots need some room to grow. This might not lead to a miracle but tax
reform, deregulation, and a number of other AS policies can lead to more
economic capacity and growth. AD will follow. So will our incomes.