As many of
you know I am a retired professor. That means prunes for lunch followed by a
well-deserved nap. Recently I was invited to a lecture at my local university
and in a fit of insanity I decided to encounter traffic, parking, and
students-walking-with-phones. I am happy to report that I made it to
the lecture and back home without incident.
I won’t go
into the details but it was a very prestigious group of speakers with prominent
alumni in the audience and many of the grad students wearing their finest coveralls.
Some of the speakers represented the past and present of the Fed.
I am both
glad and sorry that I attended. I am sorry because I am not used to sitting so
long in regular (not sweat) pants with a belt. I am also not used to other
speakers going on and on and on. It isn’t so bad when I excite my audience with
thirty minute explanations about totally obvious points – but when I am at the
receiving end it is quite another matter. But I am not sorry I went because I learned a
lot from these speakers.
They spoke about the onset of the last recession,
about policies aimed at the recession, and they ended by speaking about the
future. Much of what they said I agreed
with. But some of what they said really alarmed me.
Agreement –
in the face of the worst financial and global economic crisis since the Great Depression,
the government and the Fed needed to provide some quick liquidity and some
stimulus. I am not one of those economists who believe that in 2008 Adam Smith’s
so-called Invisible Hand was the best approach. The Fed should have played the
role of lender of last resort. The government should have applied some
stimulus. But once we agree on that then we start to take different paths.
This is not
the place to enumerate all the differences. Instead I want to focus on a couple
of threads that really scared me. The first has to do with the assessment of
the Fed’s use of quantitative easing or QE. One panel member said that when
interest rates get to zero, then QE is necessary. So it was perfectly okay and
successful for the Fed to begin actively buying mortgage-backed securities and long-term
government bonds. The reason this was okay and successful was evidenced,
according to this speaker, by stabilizing inflation expectations.
Note: These speakers said a lot of
things and I have to admit that I was dozing now and then. So it is perfectly
okay for the reader to interpret my remarks as targeting some unspecified
speaker if I have not faithfully represented views actually espoused that fine day.
One could
say that since inflation is the key objective of the Fed, it goes without saying
that a policy to address inflationary expectations was well in the purview of
the Fed. Since demand and inflation were falling at the onset of the recession, it seems the Fed did the
right thing with QE. But that would be too simple for several reasons. First,
with its usual tools, the Fed’s mandate has always been macroeconomic. The Fed is
not supposed to bailout a tornado-damaged community or help a beleaguered
furniture industry. It had a dual mandate to approach national goals for
inflation and unemployment. Buying short-term government bonds so as to
influence the federal funds rate was compatible with stabilizing the economy.
But buying mortgage bonds and long-term government bonds is a horse of a
different color.
Second, buying
mortgage bonds is basically what it is – helping out the mortgage market and
the housing industry. You might argue that if the mortgage market was the
source of national problems then it made sense to buy mortgages. But that’s a
sticky wicket since QE started well after the beginning of the recession and
continues today. Many would say that this practice of focusing on a particular
industry is simply inappropriate because it is really fiscal policy. I would
also say that it has already become ingrained in Fed policy and thinking. Somehow
the Fed has gone from monetary policy to fiscal policy. Since the government is
supposed to be the one doing fiscal policy is just doesn’t make sense. The Fed
has neither the appropriate tools nor the jurisdiction to have permanently
changed its modus operandi. Remember what the Fed does is determined by
national law. As far as I know the law didn’t change.
Third, buying
long-term government bonds is also another change and a ruse at that. It is no
secret that government stimulus programs dramatically increased the need for
the government to borrow. Having the Fed in these markets creating a huge demand has certainly made it
much easier for the government to borrow – and keep borrowing long after the
storm has passed. Was this QE done to stabilize inflation or to support
government borrowing? If it was the latter then in just a few years this Fed
has thrown away both its independence and credibility.
The second
worry is that the Fed has no real plan to stop QE. Sure it has been slowing
purchases for a few months but there is still no clear evidence it will stick
to this path when Chair Yellen regurgitates Bernanke’s promise to keep interest
rates at near zero until the economy is clearly strong enough. But is the road to Hell not paved with good intentions?
Every time the economy reaches another milestone the Fed smiles and tapers, and then
the markets react badly. Good news is bad news? Postponing the tapering then
leads to market jubilation. Is Janet Yellen really going to remove the punch
bowl? If markets bless less tapering – the Fed takes this as a sign of policy
success. When the market hisses at more tapering, surely the Fed will cave to
the markets drug addiction for Fed asset buying.
The Fed put itself and us between a rock and a hard place by
promising low interest rates when every indicator is that rates will and should
rise to more normal levels. If the Fed does the right thing and returns to a
normal policy, rates will likely overshoot and create another recession. The
government will accuse the Fed of terrible acts since it will have to borrow at
higher rates. Housing market participants will cry even louder. If the Fed does the wrong
thing QE will feed bubbles in housing, government bonds, and stock markets, facilitate the spending
and debt appetite of the government, raise inflation expectations, raise
interest rates, and likely cause a quick growth spurt followed by a recession.
There are
good reasons why the Fed had a simple mandate. A one-armed juggler can only
keep so many balls in the air. This Fed has too many balls in the air and they
will soon be landing on our heads. No more seminars for me!
Perhaps this proposal will take some of the onus off the Fed........groan!
ReplyDeletehttp://blog.heritage.org/2014/04/08/legislation-let-government-take-u-s-mortgage-market/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social
Fuzz -- you can't win for losing.
DeleteDear LSD. Maybe if you had worn your leisure suit and flip flops you'd have enjoyed the seminar more.
ReplyDeleteTrue Tuna, But they must have been in the washing machine.
DeleteI wonder if there has been any other time in history where the Fed blurred the line between fiscal policy and monetary policy? I was surprised at the mortgage purchases and took full advantage of it getting a 3.25% mortgage.
ReplyDeleteWar did it! In 1951 the Fed and the Treasury had a famous Accord in which they agreed that the Fed would get its independence back and would no longer have to buy treasuries and keep interest rates near zero. Of course formal independence is different from actual behavior. There were times in the 1960s/70s when the Fed acted "as if" it were buying directly from the Treasury -- and that's what the term "monitizing the debt" comes from. The Fed was buying the treasuries from the open market but it seemed as if they were just buying directly from the government.
DeleteMr Yachts, it appears that I didn't answer your question. Ignore what I wrote above. I cannot think of any major instances of the Fed doing fiscal policy until recently. The S&L crisis was eventually faced by government legislation and I don't recall the Fed having much to do with the solution -- except when tight monetary policy brought interest rates back down. But that was traditional monetary policy on the part of the Fed.
Delete